Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

State of Utah v. Larry Dean Coleman : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kris C. Leonard; Brenda J. Beaton; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Heather Johnson; James A. Valdez; Sale Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Coleman, No. 20000626 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2836

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

LARRY DEAN COLEMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 20000626-CA
Priority No. 15

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appeal from an order dismissing the Information charging
Larry Dean Coleman with the operation of a clandestine
laboratory, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37d-4(1) (a) and/or (b) (1998); possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (1998); and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(1998).
HEATHER JOHNSON (6934)
JAMES A. VALDEZ (3308)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee
KRIS C. LEONARD (4902)
BRENDA J. BEATON (6832)
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

LARRY DEAN COLEMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 20000626-CA
Priority No. 15

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appeal from an order dismissing the Information charging
Larry Dean Coleman with the operation of a clandestine
laboratory, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37d-4(1) (a) and/or (b) (1998); possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (1998); and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(1998).
HEATHER JOHNSON (6934)
JAMES A. VALDEZ (3308)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee
KRIS C. LEONARD (4902)
BRENDA J. BEATON (6832)
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE WAS
APPROPRIATE WHERE MR. COLEMAN HAD EXECUTED A
NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR 120 DAY DISPOSITION 2 08
DAYS EARLIER, AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
DETERMINED IN FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT MOST TIME
LAPSES IN THIS CASE WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO
MR. COLEMAN
A.

B.

C.

11

The Trial Court's Ruling that the Period
Of Delay Between 16 November 1999 and 30
November 1999 was not Attributable to Mr.
Coleman is not Clearly Erroneous

17

Eighteen Days Should be Added to the Trial
Court's Original Calculation Because the
Period of November 15th Through November 3 0th
Properly Began on October 28th, When Mr.
Coleman Executed the 120-Day Disposition
Notice

21

Because the Primary Reason for Continuing
The January 2 0th Hearing was the Prosecutor's
Failure to Call a Key Witness, the Trial
Court Correctly Found that the Period Between
1 February 200 and 24 February 2000 was not
Attributable to Mr. Coleman

25

II

BECAUSE MR. COLEMAN GAVE PROPER NOTICE OF HIS
DEMAND FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES, THE
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF ALL THREE CHARGES IN
THIS CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WITHIN 12 0
DAYS WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR

CONCLUSION

28
35

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
Utah Const., art. I § 13

19, 20

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (1998)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1) (1998)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5(l) (1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1)

1
10, 30-31

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1999)
3, 8-10, 14-15, 17, 21-22, 28-29, 31-35
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5(1999)

33

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j ) (1996)

2

STATE RULES
Utah R. Crim. Pro. 7 (g) (1) (2001)

20

Utah R. Crim. Pro. 7 (h) (2) (2001)

27

Utah R. Crim. Pro. 9.5 (2001)

32

iii

STATE CASES
Deland v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753 (Utah 1985)

30-32
15

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

34-35

State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 144, 1 P.3d 1108

16, 18

State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998) . 14-15, 17, 20, 24, 28
State v. Jensen. 136 P.2d 949 (Utah 1943)

20

State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 41

. . ..

2, 14, 30, 32
State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

. . . 15-16

State v. Martin. 765 P.2d 854 (Utah 1988)

33

State v. Ortega. 751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988)

20

State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991)

13-17

State v. Phathammavonq. 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

. ..

2, 15-16
State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986
State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997)
State v. Teuscher. 883 P.2d 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
State v. Truiillo. 656 P.2d 403 (Utah 1982) . . . .
State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982)

2
19
11, 19, 26
15-16, 24, 33
16, 24

State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1985)

13

State v. Wilson. 453 P.2d 158 (Utah 1969)

24

State v. Wright. 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987)

32

iv

Wade v. Stanal. 869 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

11, 26

TREATISES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
(10th ed. 1997)

31

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
:

v.

:

LARRY DEAN COLEMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 20000626-CA
Priority No. 15

:

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
The State appeals from the trial court's final ordersdismissing the Information charging Larry Dean Coleman [uMr.
Coleman"] with the operation of a clandestine laboratory, a
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d4(1) (a) and/or (b) (1998);2 possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (1998) ;3 and possession of

l

A copy of the trial court's "Order of Dismissal," R. 95, is
attached as Addendum A.
2

Notice was given in the Information that Mr. Coleman was
subject to the enhanced penalty of a first degree felony pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5(1)(d), (f), and/or (g) because "the
intended laboratory operation was to, or did, take place within
500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school;
and/or the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced an
amount of a specified controlled substance, to-wit:
Methamphetamine, and/or the intended laboratory operation was for
the production of Methamphetamine base." R. 3.
3

Although this statute was amended affective 1 May 2000,
the Information was issued prior to that on 19 October 1999.

drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) .
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2) (j) (1996) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue; Did the trial court correctly determine that the
prosecution failed in its affirmative duty to bring Mr. Coleman
to trial within 120 days after he delivered proper written notice
of his demand for disposition of pending charges?
Standard of Review: This issue is subject to a bifurcated review.
Insofar as it relates to matters of statutory interpretation,
this court reviews for correctness, "according no particular
deference to the trial court's interpretation." State v. Lindsay,
2000 UT App 379, 1J4, 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 41. With regard to the
trial court's factual findings, such as determinations of whether
a delay was attributable to the defendant, this court applies "a
clearly erroneous standard." State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d
1001, 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Therefore we cite to the former version of the statute. See State
v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, 1|4 n.2, 992 P.2d 986 (" [W] e apply the law
as it existed at the time of the crime charged.")

2

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION
The following statute is determinative of the issue on
appeal:
Prisoner's Demand for Disposition, Utah Code Ann. § 77-291(1999)
The full text of this statute is provided in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The chronology of proceedings in this case is as follows:
28 September 1999

Mr. Coleman is arrested after
police discover marijuana,
methamphetamine, and material
often used to make and package
drugs in a motel room where he
is staying. R. 286 [32-36].

19 October 1999

An Information is issued
charging Mr. Coleman with one
count of operating a clandestine
laboratory, one count of
possession of drugs with the
intent to distribute, and one
count of possession of drug
paraphernalia. R. 3-6.

28 October 1999

Mr. Coleman executes a "Notice
and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charges," R. 42, and an
"Office Memorandum" on the
subject of "12 0 Day
Dispositions." R. 45.

29 October 1999

Defense counsel makes a formal
request for discovery. R. 12-13.

2 November 1999

Roll call is held, and a
preliminary hearing is scheduled

3

f o r November 3 0 t h . R. 285

[2] .

15 November 1999

Utah State Prison stamps the
''Notice and Request for
Disposition of Pending Charges"
as "Received." R. 42, 289 [32].

3 0 November 1999

In proceedings before the court,
a conflict of interest is noted
by the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, which was
representing both Mr. Coleman
and his co-defendant, Ms.
Coleman. Another roll call is
scheduled. R. 283 [3-4] .

6 December 1999

Utah State Prison authorized
agent acknowledges receipt of
the "Notice and Request for
Disposition of Pending Charges
R. 42. Prosecutor's office
receives the Notice. R. 289
[11] .

21 December 1999

Upon stipulation of counsel, and
to allow time to conflict Ms.
Coleman's case out of the Salt
Lake Legal Defender's office,
the preliminary hearing is set
for January 2 0th
18-20

20 January 2 000

The first pcirt of the
preliminary hearing is held. It
is continued until February 24th
at 9 p.m. R. 286 [6-7, 71] .

24 February 2 000

The second part of the
preliminary hearing is held, and
Mr. Coleman is bound over. R.
287 [80] .

20 March 2000

Mr. Coleman is arraigned and
pleads not guilty. R. 282 [3-5] .
Defense counsel informs the
court of its intention to file a
4

motion to dismiss on the basis
of the 120-day disposition, and
a motion to suppress. Defense
counsel also requests a trial
date. R. 282 [5]. The hearing
date for the motions is set for
May 15th. R. 282 [8] .
24 March 2000

Defense counsel's "Memorandum in
Support of Defendants Motion to
Dismiss" is filed. R. 39.

27 March 2000

Defense counsel's "Motion to
Suppress" and supporting
memorandum is filed. R. 48, R.
50.

15 May 2000

Hearing is held on the motions
to dismiss and suppress. The
trial court finds there are only
six days remaining in the 12 0day period which the prosecutor
had to bring Mr. Coleman to
trial. R. 289 [33].

23 May 2000

Trial court dismisses the case
on the grounds that the
prosecution failed to bring Mr.
Coleman to trial within 12 0 days
after receiving notice of
disposition. R. 95.

The State filed timely Notice of Appeal in the Utah Supreme
Court. R. 97. Mr. Coleman filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction,4 and the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to
this Court pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

4

The Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum are
provided in Addendum C.

5

Procedure.5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On 28 September 1999 three police officers arrived at room
310 at a Quality Inn in Sandy with a warrant for the arrest of
Jamie Coleman ["Ms. Coleman"]. R. 286 [11-12], R. 287 [55-56].
They knocked on the door and Ms. Coleman eventually emerged,
closing the door behind her. R. 287 [56]. A female officer,
Carrie Geer ["Officer Geer"], informed her that she was under
arrest. R. 287 [57], Ms. Coleman, who wore only a shirt, said she
wanted to get dressed. R. 287 [57-58]. Officer Geer assented and
accompanied her into the motel room. Id. The other two officers
stood in the doorway. R. 286 [16].
Inside the room, Officer Geer saw a "fog at the top of the
room," and she had a hard time breathing. R. 287 [59]. She also
saw a package that looked like it contained marijuana. Id.
Without advising Ms. Coleman of her Miranda rights, Officer Geer
asked her about the package, and Ms. Coleman replied that it was
marijuana. Id. Officer Geer also saw material often used to
package drugs, and ingredients and equipment often used to make
drugs. R. 287 [60]. She also smelled methamphetamine. R. 287

5

The order is provided in Addendum D.

6

[71]. She relayed this information to the other officers. R. 287
[61-62].
From the doorway, the officers noticed a man, later
identified as Mr. Coleman, in the room. R. 286 [18]. One of the
officers began asking Mr. Coleman questions, and Mr. Coleman
requested an attorney. R. 286 [18-19]. The police placed him
under arrest. R. 286 [20]. Soon after, Ms. Coleman gave
handwritten permission for police to search the room. R. 286
[23]. The police made a "brief" search of the room. Id. Police
eventually seized a number of items as evidence. R. 286 [32-34].

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court's dismissal of this case for failure to
bring Mr. Coleman to trial within 120 days after he filed notice
and demand for 12 0-day disposition should be affirmed. More than
208 days had passed since Mr. Coleman executed the appropriate
documents, and the trial court made factual findings that most
periods of delay in this case were not attributable to Mr.
Coleman.
The State argues that three periods of time were
attributable to Mr. Coleman, and that the 120-day period should
have been tolled during these periods. The State is correct with
regard to one three-day period between 27 March 2000 and 30 March
7

2000, but failed to marshal the evidence to show that the trial
court was incorrect in its findings that the 14-day period
between 16 November 1999 and 3 0 November 1999 and the 23-day
period between 1 February 2 000 and 24 February 2 000 were not
attributable to Mr. Coleman.
The record supports the trial court's findings with regard
to these two periods of delay. The transcript from the November
2nd roll call and the discovery request documents indicate that
the 14-day delay between 16 November 1999 and 3 0 November 1999
was due to difficulties with obtaining discovery. Additionally,
the State's argument that the delay is attributable to Mr.
Coleman because he refrained from waiving his right to a
preliminary hearing is insupportable. Preliminary hearings are a
constitutionally-established component of bringing a criminal
defendant to trial, are normally expected, and do not surprise
the prosecution with unnecessary delays.
Additionally, 18 days should be added to this 14-day delay.
The 12 0-day period commenced when Mr. Coleman executed paperwork
on October 28th, and the trial court incorrectly gave the benefit
of the period between October 28th and November 15th to the State.
Under section 77-29-1, the 120-day period begins when written
notice is delivered to "the warden, sheriff or custodial officer
in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same . . . ." Utah
8

Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999) . Paperwork was executed on October
28th, and the slowness of the prison administration in processing
the paperwork does not work to the detriment of Mr. Coleman under
section 77-29-1.
With regard to the 23-day delay between 1 February 2000 and
24 February 2000, the record indicates that the principal reasons
for this delay were the prosecution's failure to call a necessary
witness at the preliminary hearing, the judge's scheduling
conflicts, and the prosecutor's preference for a 9 a.m. hearing,
as well as the defense counsel's scheduling conflicts. This
provides ample support for the trial court's factual finding that
this delay was not attributable to Mr. Coleman, and the State
failed to marshal the evidence to show that this finding was
clearly erroneous.
Finally, the dismissal of all three charges against Mr.
Coleman should be affirmed because Mr. Coleman gave proper notice
and request for disposition of all three charges. Mr. Coleman's
"Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges[]"
described that there were charges of "Clandestine Lab," R. 42,
and the accompanying "Office Memorandum" clarified that the
charges were "Clandestine Lab; Posses [s]ion with Intent to
Distribute." The "Office Memorandum" also included the case
number, which referred to all three charges of Operating a

9

Clandestine Lab, Possession of a Controlled Substance with the
Intent to Distribute, and Unlawful Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia. R. 45. Thus, Mr. Coleman gave proper notice of the
charges pending against him.
The State's argument, that because section 77-29-1 uses the
singular term of "charge" each charge must be specified in the
notice, Aplt. Br. 18, ignores the record and the basic rules of
statutory construction. The record indicates that Mr. Coleman
included all three charges in his "Office Memorandum" by
including the case number and description of the nature of the
charges. R. 45. Also, the basic rules of statutory construction
indicate that, besides looking to the plain meaning of words, the
singular use of words shall include the plural, and the plural
the singular. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) (2000) . Therefore,
section 77-29-1 must be deemed to apply to "charges" pending
against a defendant as well as a "charge." Under this
construction, Mr. Coleman gave more than adequate notice of the
"nature" of the charges pending against him.

10

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE WAS APPROPRIATE
WHERE MR, COLEMAN HAD EXECUTED A NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR 12 0
DAY DISPOSITION 208 DAYS EARLIER, AND THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY DETERMINED IN FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT MOST TIME
LAPSES IN THIS CASE WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MR, COLEMAN
The State failed to marshal the evidence to show that the

trial court abused its discretion in finding that several time
lapses in this case were not attributable to Mr. Coleman.6 With
regard to the calculation of the 120-day period, the trial court
made the following findings of fact:
* The 120-day period began on 16 November 1999. R. 289 [32].
On the 15th, the Utah State Prison had stamped the "Notice and
Request for Disposition of Pending Charges[]" as "received." R.
42.
* The period between 30 November 1999 and 21 December 1999
tolled "because of the conflict with attorneys." R. 289 [33]. On
30 November 1999 Mr. Coleman's defense counsel had appeared at
the scheduled preliminary hearing and had requested a continuance

6

See State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah Ct. App.
1994)("If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of
the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law
in the case."); Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App.
1994)("xIf the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of
the trial court.'")(citation omitted).
tl

because of a conflict of interest regarding the representation of
Mr. Coleman and his co-defendant, Ms. Coleman. R. 283 [3-5] .
* The time between 21 December 1999 and 2 0 January 2 0 00 was
counted "consistent with the State taking responsibility" for
that time. R. 289 [33].
* The time between January 2 0th and March 2 0th was counted.
The court stated, "it doesn't matter if it's the court or if it's
the State, it needs to go forward. And there's no reason for me
not to count those 60 days." Id. The court added later, "the
court is responsible to move the cases forward too and so I don't
find any basis for tolling the 120-day period between those two
dates." R. 289 [35] .
* The 12 0-day period tolled beginning on the date that Mr.
Coleman filed the motion to suppress, which the trial court found
to be March 30th. R. 289 [33]. The court stated, "I find that the
motion to suppress does stay because that is a defendant's
choice, and you have a right to have a motion to suppress.
Because of that, to have that be added to the 120 days doesn't
make sense." Id.
* By the time the motion to dismiss hearing was held, 114
days of the 12 0-day period had elapsed. Id. The court could not
schedule the trial during the remaining six days, R. 289 [35-36],
and the prosecutor failed to arrange a date with a different
12

trial judge. Therefore, this case was dismissed. R. 95.
With one three-day exception,7 the State failed to marshal the
evidence to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
counting any of the above days towards the 12 0-day period.8
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that section 77-29-1
places the burden of compliance on the prosecutor. State v.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1991); State v. Viles, 702 P.2d
1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) .9 As the Court explained, "the prosecutor
7

As the State pointed out, Aplt Br. 11-12, the trial court
erroneously stated that the Motion to Suppress was filed 3 0 March
2000. R. 289 [35]. The motion and supporting memorandum were
actually filed 27 March 2000. R. 48-55.
This three-day error is not fatal to the trial court's
dismissal of this case. The dismissal was signed 9 days after the
hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, and that places the dismissal
at precisely 120 days after Mr. Coleman filed his notice of 120day disposition.
8

A chart is provided in Addendum E comparing the trial
court's and State's calculation of the 120-day period with Mr.
Coleman's calculation.
9

The statute provides:

Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment
in the state prison, jail or other penal or
correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried
indictment or information, and the prisoner shall
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a
written demand specifying the nature of the charge, and
the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled
to have the charge brought to trial within 12 0 days of
the date of delivery of written notice.

13

has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard
within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to
notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to
make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." State v.
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998). This Court has also
acknowledged that it is the prosecutor's duty to ensure that the
defendant is brought to trial within 120 days after filing a
notice. State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, \l

f

411 Utah Adv. Rep.

41.
Where a defendant is not brought to trial within the
proscribed time, "good cause may support the prosecutor's failure
to comply." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16. Good cause is not shown
where "the prosecutor's failure is inaction," Id. at 916, such as
"doing nothing whatsoever to bring [the defendant's] case to
trial within the statutory period." Id. Neither is it shown
simply by the fact that "the delay was not caused by the
prosecutor." Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1) (1999) . However,
After written demand is delivered as required in
Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the
defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open
court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present,
may be granted any reasonable continuance.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (3) (1999) .

14

Ultimately, the trial court may find good cause based upon
its underlying findings of fact with regard to the reason for the
delay.10 Some facts that have formed a reasonable basis for a
finding of "good cause" for delay include conflicts of interest
with the defense counsel where the delay was not prolonged;
Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426-27; the defendant's request for a
preliminary hearing after a hearing had already been waived;
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916; illness of the defense counsel; State v.
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985), and the defendant's
change of defense counsel along with several requests for
continuances and an agreement to postpone the trial.
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004; State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319,
1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In reviewing a trial court's dismissal of a case based upon
the prosecutor's failure to bring an action within 120 days, the
standard of review is bifurcated. Section 77-29-1 itself
indicates that, where a motion to dismiss is brought:
the [trial] court shall review the proceeding. If the
court finds that the failure of the prosecuting
attorney to have the matter heard within the time
required is not supported by good cause, whether a
previous motion for continuance was made or not, the
court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.

10

Heaton, 968 P.2d at 916-17; Petersen, 810 P.2d at 427;
State v. Truiillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1982); State v.
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

15

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (4) (1999) . The trial court's
interpretations of this statute are conclusions of law reviewed
on appeal for correctness. Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425. However,
the court's underlying factual findings which provide the basis
for its decision to dismiss a case may be overturned only if they
are clearly erroneous. Truiillo, 656 P.2d at 405; Phathammavong,
860 P. 2d at 1004. This is because the trial court is

xx

in an

advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and determine the
facts." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1fl7 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108.
Findings which are factual include findings about the cause of a
delay, Truiillo, 656 P.2d at 405/ which party, if any, was at
fault regarding the delay, Maestas, 815 P.2d at 1321-22; and
whether the delay was attributable to the defendant.
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004; State v.

Velasquez, 641 P.2d

115, 116-17 (Utah 1982).
In this case the trial court's underlying factual findings
are at issue,11 and the State failed to show that these findings

In its brief, the State characterizes the issue as one of
law. Aplt. Br. 3-4. However, its argument is directed mainly
towards the trial court's factual findings regarding whether
three periods of delay, the 14-day period between 15 November
1999 and 3 0 November 1999, the 23-day period between 1 February
200 and 24 February 2000, and the three-day period between 27
March 2 000 and 3 0 March 2 000 were attributable to Mr. Coleman.
Aplt. Br. 11-14. Thus, the proper standard of review in this case
is one of clear error. Pathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004.
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were clearly erroneous. The record indicates that the prosecutor
failed in her "affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter
heard within the statutory period," Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915
because she failed to "notify the court that a detainer notice"
had been filed, Id. and "good cause,"12 such as "a request on the
part of the defense for a continuance and/or a relatively short
delay caused by unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to
trial," Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426, did not support the full
length of the delay. Because the State has not carried its
burden, the trial court's dismissal of this case should be
affirmed.

A.

The Trial Court's Ruling that the Period of Delay Between 16
November 1999 and 30 November 1999 was not Attributable to
Mr, Coleman is not Clearly Erroneous
The State's argument that the period between November 16th

and November 3 0th was attributable to Mr. Coleman because the
defense counsel had previously requested a preliminary hearing
set a month after roll call does not demonstrate that the trial
court's ruling was clearly erroneous. The State argued, "[a]t a

12

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999) ("If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not,
the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.")
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hearing on November 2, defendant not only requested a preliminary
hearing, but expressly requested that it be set thirty days away,
instead of allowing it to be set within the ten-day period
provided by rule 7(g)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure []."
Aplt. Br. 12 (citation omitted). As a result, the hearing was set
for November 30th when, "under normal circumstances," it would
have been set "on or before November 12." Aplt. Br. 12-13.
Therefore, the State argues, the period between November 15th and
30th is attributable to Mr. Coleman. Aplt Br. 13.
Contrary to the State's arguments, the trial court made a
finding of fact that this period is not attributable to Mr.
Coleman, R. 289 [32], and expressly rejected the prosecutor's
argument that the period is attributable to him because of his
request for a preliminary hearing. R. 289 [34]. In challenging
this finding, the State failed to marshal the evidence to
demonstrate that the finding is incorrect. To challenge a finding
of fact, "an appellant must first marshal all the evidence that
supports

the trial court's findings. . . . After marshaling the

supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
court's

ruling,

to the

trial

the evidence is insufficient to support the trial

court's findings." Gamblin, 2000 UT 144, fl7 n.2. The State
completely failed to do this. Aplt. Br. 12-13. Therefore, the
18

State's argument should not be considered and the trial court's
finding should be affirmed. Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 929-30.
Even if the State marshaled the evidence, its argument fails
because the record supports the trial court's finding. Although
the defense counsel appeared at roll call on November 2nd and
requested a preliminary hearing ''approximately a month away," he
also made a comment, which was mostly inaudible on the
transcript, regarding discovery. R. 285 [2] . At that time
discovery had been requested from the State, R. 12-13, but had
apparently not been received. R. 283 [3], R. 289 [28]. On this
basis, the trial court's finding that the delay was not
attributable to Mr. Coleman is supportable.13
Additionally, a request for a preliminary hearing, which is
afforded criminal defendants charged with felonies as a matter of
right, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13, does not toll the 120-day

Although the trial court did not state that the delay was
caused by the State's failure to provide Mr. Coleman with
discovery, the court found that the delay was not attributable to
Mr. Coleman. Where "xfactual issues are presented to and must be
resolved by the trial court but no finding of fact appears in the
record, we "assume that the trier of [the] facts found them in
accord with its decision, and we affirm the decision if from the
evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it."'"
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Utah 1997)(quoting State
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991)(quoting Mower v.
McCarthy, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1952))).
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period. A preliminary hearing is constitutionally mandated,14
provided for by Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,15
and solidly established by case law.16 It is a normal, expected
component of prosecuting a criminal defendant, and cannot be said
to surprise the prosecution with extensive delays of time.17 It
Article 1, section 13 of the Utah Constitution indicates
that, [o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived
by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment,
with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of
the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature." Utah Const. Art. 1, Sec. 13.
u

15

Rule 7(g) (1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that, uIf a defendant is charged with a felony, the
defendant shall be advised of the right to a preliminary
examination. If the defendant waives the right to a preliminary
examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the
magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the
district court." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 7(g) (1) (2001) .
16

Case law has long recognized a criminal defendant's right
to a preliminary hearing. See State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138,
1139 (Utah 1988)(defendant was denied his right to a preliminary
hearing where the testimony presented at trial involved a
criminal episode for which he had not been bound over); State v.
Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 954-55 (Utah 1943)(defendant can't be tried
and convicted on a charge upon which he was not given, or on
which he did not waive, any preliminary hearing).
17

The circumstances here are distinguishable from this in
State v. Heaton. In Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court found that the
delay was attributable to the defendant because he had initially
waived a preliminary hearing. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. Then, 30
days later, he changed his mind and requested a preliminary
hearing. Id. at 913. If he had not changed his mind, the
defendant would have been brought to trial "just 6 days after his
written notice had been delivered." Id. at 916. Thus, the delay
was attributable to the defendant in that case.
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does not provide "good cause" for "the failure of the prosecuting
attorney to have the matter heard within the time required . . .
." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). Even more importantly, it
does not demonstrate that the trial court's factual finding that
the period between November 15th and November 3 0th was not
attributable to Mr. Coleman was clearly erroneous.

B.

Eighteen Days Should be Added to the Trial Courts Original
Calculation Because the Period of November 15th Through
November 30th Properly Began on October 28th, When Mr,
Coleman Executed the 120-Day Disposition Notice
The trial court's ruling that the 120-day period commenced

on November 15th was incorrect because the period properly began
on October 28th, and 18 days should be added to the trial court's
original calculation. The trial court's explanation for this
ruling was as follows:
The defendant filed his 120-day disposition papers on
October 2 8th. I'm finding that the operative date to
begin calculating the 12 0-day period is November 16th.
And that is giving the benefit, frankly, to the state
prison. Once it's at least logged in to the State, the
prison records, it's the duty of the prison to move it
immediately forward. So that's the date I'm starting
from, between November 16th and November 30th. It's a
14-day period that is part of the, that I'm calculating

In this case, Mr. Coleman did not waive his right to a
preliminary hearing and then later change his mind. He merely
refrained from waiving his statutory right to a preliminary
hearing which would have taken place in the absence of
affirmative waiver.
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as part of this 120-day period.
R. 289 [32]. Contrary to this ruling, under the 120-day
disposition statute the court was not entitled to give the
benefit of those 18 days to the State, but should have counted
them as part of the 12 0-day period.
The statute indicates that the 12 0-day period commences when
written notice is delivered to "the warden, sheriff or custodial
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same . . .
." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999). Further, it is the duty of
the "warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the
demand . . ."to "cause the demand to be forwarded by personal
delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-29-1(2) (1999) .
Here the 12 0-day period commenced on October 2 8th because
that was date on which Mr. Coleman executed the notice, and the
evidence supports that he delivered it on that date. R. 42, 45.
The evidence, fully marshaled in favor of the trial court's
finding that the 12 0-day period commenced on November 15th, not
only fails to support the court's finding but supports that Mr.
Coleman executed and delivered the Notice on October 2 8th. The
evidence is as follows:
* Wasatch Records and the Utah State Prison stamped the
22

"Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges []" as
"Received" on November 15th. R. 42. However, the Notice, along
with the accompanying paper entitled "Division of Institutional
Operations Office Memorandum" is dated October 2 8th.
* "Authorized Agent" Mary Brockbader signed the Notice on
December 6th, and then prepared the "Certificate of Inmate
Status" for the "Salt Lake County Attorney." R. 42-44. That day,
she also wrote a letter indicating Mr. Coleman was filing a 120day notice for "untried charges of Clandestine Lab, Poss with
intent to dist . . . ." R. 46.
* On December 14th, $5.96 was deducted from Mr. Coleman's
prison account, as indicated on the "Offender of Account
Activity." R. 47.
This evidence indicates that the prison was not punctual in
processing Mr. Coleman's Notice. The Notice was not signed in by
an authorized agent and forwarded to the prosecutor and trial
court until 21 days after it had been stamped "Received." R. 4246. Then, the funds for postage and processing were not deducted
until 8 days after the Notice had been processed and mailed. R.
47. The most logical inference from this is that the prison
received Mr. Coleman's Notice on the day he executed it, which
was October 28th, and, consistent with its later handling of the
paperwork, was slow to acknowledge it. There is nothing in the
23

record to indicate that the Notice was not delivered on October
28th, and the trial court itself noted that it was giving the
benefit of the doubt to the prison. R. 289 [32].
Under the 120-day disposition statute, the prison's slowness
in processing and forwarding paperwork does not work to the
detriment of Mr. Coleman.18 If it did, paperwork could be kept in
the prison administration system indefinitely, preventing the
120-day period from commencing, and thereby rendering the 12 0-day
detainer statute illusory. Because this statute was enacted to
"precisely define what is meant by "speedy trial' as that term is
used in the constitutions of the various states,"19 the
constitutional right to a speedy trial would be compromised if
this Court holds that the prison administration may indefinitely
postpone commencement of the 120-day period by holding up
paperwork.
Thus, the 12 0-day period should not have been calculated
from November 15th, but should have been calculated from October
28th, when Mr. Coleman executed the proper paperwork.

18

Administrative errors are not "good cause" which justify
the prosecutor's failure to bring a defendant to trial within the
120-day period. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 (court clerk's error
did not constitute "good cause" for the prosecutor's failure to
bring defendant to trial within 12 0 days.)
19

State v. Wilson, 453 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1969); accord
Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116; Truiillo, 656 P.2d at 404.
24

C.

Because the Primary Reason for Continuing the January 20th
Hearing was the Prosecutor's Failure to Call a Key Witness,
the Trial Court Correctly Found that the Period Between 1
February 2000 and 24 February 2000 was not Attributable to
Mr, Coleman
The State's argument that the defense counsel's scheduling

conflict constituted "good cause" for the period of delay between
1 February 2 000 and 24 February 2 000 does not demonstrate that
the trial court's contrary finding was clearly erroneous where
the prosecutor failed to call a key witness at the January 2 0th
hearing. The State indicates that the preliminary hearing held
January 20th was "continued for two reasons: 1) the trial judge
had another commitment that afternoon; and 2) defense counsel
wanted to subpoena an officer who was not present on that date
[]." Aplt. Br. 13 (citation omitted). The State argues that the
date of February 1st was available, but because the defense
counsel was unavailable on that date, the date of February 24th
was chosen. Id. Thus, the State argues, 23 days between 1
February 2000 and 24 February 2 000 should not have been counted
in the trial court's calculation of the 120-day period. Aplt. Br.
13-14.
The State failed to marshal the evidence to show that the
trial court's finding that this delay was not attributable to Mr.
Coleman is clearly erroneous, and so this Court should assume
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that the record supports the court's finding.20
Additionally, an examination of the record indicates that
there is ample support for the trial court's finding. At the
January 20th hearing, the prosecutor failed to present Officer
Carrie Geer, who made the original entry into the motel room
where Mr. Coleman was arrested, R. 286 [4-5], R. 287 [57-61], and
it was this oversight which necessitated a continuance of the
hearing. Officer Geer first saw a package of what she thought was
marijuana in the motel room, saw a fog at the top of the room
that made her eyes and skin burn, and saw ingredients and
packaging material often used in the production of
methamphetamine. R. 287 [59-60], Officer Geer told the other
officers, who were standing in the doorway, that she though there
was methamphetamine in the room. R. 287 [61]. Because of
information provided by her, the officers entered the room. Id.
Ultimately, the room was searched and Mr. Coleman was arrested.
R. 286 [19-23] . Officer Geer's testimony was therefore necessary
for the preliminary hearing.

20

See Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 929 ("If the appellant fails to
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review
of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case."); Wade, 869 P.2d at 12(w'If
the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial
court.'")(citation omitted).
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There is no indication that the trial court was prepared to
bind Mr. Coleman over for trial in the absence of Officer Geer's
testimony. The court indicated interest in Officer Geer's
testimony, R. 286 [4, 6], and made no overtures regarding a
finding of probable cause21 without her testimony. R. 2 86 [4-9,
71-72]. Thus, the primary reason for the continuance was the
prosecutor's failure to call this material witness.
In rescheduling, the defense counsel's unavailability on one
date does not make Mr. Coleman responsible for a delay which was
necessitated by the prosecutor's failure to call Officer Geer.
Even if it did, the trial court's schedule, the prosecutor's
preference for a 9 a.m. hearing, R. 286 [71], and the defense
counsel's unavailability on February 1st all contributed to
rescheduling on February 24th at 9 a.m. The prosecutor had stated
that she preferred to reschedule a 9 a.m. hearing, R. 286 [71],
and the defense counsel had said he had a conflict with
rescheduling on February 1st. Id. Both preferences were taken
into account in rescheduling. Id. Significantly, the prosecutor,
who had a duty to inform the trial court of the need for urgency

21

Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(h)(2) a defendant
may not be bound over unless evidence presented at a preliminary
hearing establishes "probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed
it." Utah R.Crim.Proc. 7(h)(2)(2000).
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due to the notice and demand for 120-day disposition,22 did not
so inform the court. In these circumstances, the trial court's
finding that the period between February 1st and February 24th is
not attributable to Mr. Coleman is not clearly erroneous.

II

BECAUSE MR. COLEMAN GAVE PROPER NOTICE OF HIS DEMAND FOR
DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES, THE TRIAL COURTIS DISMISSAL
OF ALL THREE CHARGES IN THIS CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
WITHIN 120 DAYS WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR
Mr. Coleman's "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending

Charges[]," R. 42, and accompanying "Office Memorandum," R. 45,
properly conformed to the notice requirements of section 77-29-1.
Under section 77-29-1, the notice must be "a written demand
specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is
pending," and it must request "disposition of the pending
charge." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1999).
Mr. Coleman's "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending
Charges[]" stated that he was requesting "final disposition of
any charge(s) now pending against me in any court in the State of
Utah. Charges of Clandestine Lab are now pending against me in

See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 ("When a prisoner delivers a
written notice pursuant to the detainer statute, the prosecutor
has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard
within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to
notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to
make a good faith effort to comply with the statute.")
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the Third District Court, Salt Lake County . . ." R. 42. The
accompanying "Office Memorandum" clarified that the crimes
charged were "Clandestine Lab; Posses[s]ion with Intent to
Distribute," and that the case number was 991920662 FS. R. 45.
All three charges pending against Mr. Coleman, including
operation of a clandestine laboratory, possession with intent to
distribute, and use or possession of drug paraphernalia, were
charged in the same Information, R. 3-6, and were included in
case number 991920662 FS. Thus, Mr. Coleman properly gave notice
and demand of disposition of all three charges that were pending
against him.
The State argues, however, that the trial court committed
plain error in dismissing all three charges pending against Mr.
Coleman because he "invoked the Statute only as to one charge"
Aplt. Br. 15. This argument is based on Mr. Coleman's "Notice and
Request for Disposition of Pending Charges[]," which specifies
only the charge of "Clandestine Lab." Aplt. Br. 16. The State
points out that section 77-29-1 uses the singular term of
"charge" when describing the requirements of the notice, and that
"strict compliance" with this statute therefore requires
specification of each charge in the notice. Aplt. Br. 18.
Therefore, the State argues, "the fact that the defendant
specified only one of three charges seems to suggest he did not
29

care about speedy disposition of the remaining two charges," and
these charges are still viable. Aplt. Br. 17.
This argument completely ignores Mr. Coleman's "Office
Memorandum," attached to his Notice, which described the
clandestine lab charge, the possession with intent to distribute
charge, and provided the specific case number, which includes all
three charges. R. 45.
The State's argument also ignores basic rules of statutory
construction. In interpreting statutes, ""[t]his court's primary
objective . . . is to give effect to the legislature's intent.'"
State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT. App. 379, % 5, 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 41
(citation omitted). ""When examining a statute, we look first to
its plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's
intent and purpose in passing the statute.'" Id. "Unless a
literal reading would render the statute's wording unreasonably
inoperable or confusing, we accord the wording its 'usual and
accepted meaning' and do not 'look beyond plain and unambiguous
language to ascertain legislative intent.'" Deland v. Uintah
County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Pertinent to this
case is the rule of construction articulated in Utah Code Ann. §
68-3-12(1), which states:
In the construction of these statutes, the following
general rules shall be observed, unless such
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest
30

intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context
of the statute: (a) The singular number includes the
plural, and the plural the singular.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) (2000) . Accord Deland, 945 P.2d at
174.
With regard to section 77-29-1, Mr. Coleman's ''Notice and
Disposition of Pending Charges[]" and accompanying "Office
Memorandum" adequately filled the notice requirements for all
three charges pending against him. The words used by the statute
indicate that the "nature of the charge" must be specified. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999) . These words do not mean that a
strict, technically-correct, all-inclusive statement must be made
regarding the charges. It simply requires that the "nature" of
the charges be specified. "Nature," used in this context, is
defined as "the inherent character or basic constitution of a
person or thing: essence." Merriam-Webster, Inc., MerriamWebster's Collegiate Dictionary, 774 (10th ed. 1997). Here, the
"nature" of the charges was described by Mr. Coleman in his
paperwork.
Additionally, the use of the singular term "charge" in
section 77-29-1(1) does not indicate a need for more exact
specificity. With regard to statutory interpretation, "[t]he
singular number includes the plural and the plural the singular."
Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) (1996)) . Accordingly,
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this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have often used the phrase
"charges," and well as "charge," when analyzing section 77-291(1).23 Significantly, in State v. Lindsay, this Court perceived
that section 77-29-1 contemplates that all charges contained in
one information are treated together. In holding that a notice of
120-day disposition is not viable until formal charges are filed
against a prisoner, this Court said, "[i]t is not appropriate to
tender a request in anticipation of forthcoming charges, as the
statute speaks
against

in terms

the prisoner.

of an untried

information

Spending

'" Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, 1|l0 (emphasis

added). This is in harmony with this Court's previous observation
that "an information often must include multiple counts," DeLand,
945 P.2d at 174, which are treated together.24 Finally, there is

23

State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 451 (Utah 1987) (holding
that the notice at issue did "not specify the charges,
as
required by section 77-29-1(1).")(emphasis added); Lindsay, 2000
UT App 379, K 10 (holding that "formal charges must be pending
against [a defendant] when the request is delivered. It is not
appropriate to tender a request in anticipation of forthcoming
charges . . . .")(emphasis added).
24

Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that, "[u]nless provided by law, complaints, citations, or
informations charging multilple offenses, which may include
violations of state laws, county ordinances, or municipal
ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as defined
by Section 75-1-401, shall be filed in a single court that has
jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest possible
penalty of all the offenses charged." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5
(2001) .
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no reason to treat the charges separately in this case,
particularly where the prosecutor herself did not differentiate
between them below. R. 56-67. Therefore, the descriptions
provided by Mr. Coleman of the nature of the charges against him
are not rendered inadequate on the basis of the use of the
singular word "charge" in the statute.
As a final note, the legislature's purpose in enacting this
statute and its predecessor "was to protect the constitutional
right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to prevent those charged
with enforcement of criminal statutes from holding over the head
of a prisoner undisposed charges against him." Truiillo, 656 P.2d
4 04. Other statutes enacted for this very purpose have been
liberally construed in order to effectuate the purpose. For
instance, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code Ann. §
77-29-5(1999), which requires a prisoner to be brought to trial
within 180 days after the delivery of written notice requesting
final disposition of the information, is interpreted as requiring
"substantial" rather than "strict" compliance because of the
"emphasis on the protection of prisoners' rights . . . ." State
v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1988).
In this case, Mr. Coleman's "Notice and Request for
Disposition of Pending Charges[]" gave proper notice of all three
charges under section 77-29-1, but even if it did not, the
33

legislature's intent in enacting section 77-29-1 would not be
effectuated by reversing the trial court's dismissal of all three
charges. The charges were all part of the same Information
specified by the case number in Mr. Coleman's "Office
Memorandum," and the nature of the charges, which were drug
charges, was clearly indicated in both the notice and memorandum.
In these circumstances, a reversal of the trial court's dismissal
of all three charges would oppose the legislature's intent in
enacting the statute.
Therefore, the State's argument that the trial court's
dismissal of all these charges was plain error fails under the
first requirement of successfully challenging a ruling under the
plain error analysis. That requirement is to show that uan error
exists," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993), and the
State did not show that here.25 As a matter of law, the trial

Because the State's argument fails under the first
requirement, it is unnecessary to analyze the argument under the
second and third requirements. However, the State's argument also
fails under those requirements.
The second requirement, that the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208, is not met
because the three charges were all part of the same information,
R. 3-6, were included in the case number specified in Mr.
Coleman's "Office Memorandum," R. 45, were treated together in
the same preliminary hearing, motions to suppress, and motion to
dismiss, R. 22-23, 34-35, 39-41, 48-55, and were not ever
differentiated to the court by either party. Thus, dismissing all
three charges was not an obvious error.
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court's dismissal of the three charges against Mr. Coleman should
be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's dismissal of all three charges pending
against Mr. Coleman should be affirmed because a total of 13 8
days not attributable to Mr. Coleman had passed when the trial
court dismissed the charges on May 23rd.26 This is well beyond the
12 0-day period which the State had to bring Mr. Coleman to trial,
and the trial court did not err in dismissing this case.
<22*J.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April,

2001.
HEATHER JOHNSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JAMES A. VALDEZ
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
The third requirement, that the error is harmful and that in
its absence there is reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the State, Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208, is not met
because, even if section 77-29-1 is interpreted according to the
State's argument regarding technical specificity of each
individual charge, Mr. Coleman met this requirement. He specified
the case number, which included all of the charges, in his
paperwork and this provided even more information than the
required description of the "nature" of the charges.
26

See the "120 Day Disposition Calculation Comparison"
attached in Addendum E.
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ADDENDUM A

JAMES A. VALDEZ (3308)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,

LARRY COLEMAN,

CaseNo.991920662FS
JUDGE JUDITH ATHERTON

Defendant.

Defendant, LARRY COLEMAN, represented by counsel, JAMES A. VALDEZ, having
motioned this Court to dismiss the Information in the above-entitled case on grounds that
prosecution of this case is barred under Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (1999) (requiring the State to
bring an incarcerated defendant to trial within 120 days of receiving notice from the defendant
requesting disposition of pending charges) and the State having failed to so do.
FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, the above entitled matter is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

Z-3

DATED ifjisjZ6, day of May 2000.

v^JUDGE JUDITH ATHERTON
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

00095

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Brenda Beaton
Assistant Attorney General acting in behalf of Salt Lake District Attorney, 348 East South
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

of May, 2000.
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ADDENDUM B

DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

77-29-1

CHAPTER 29
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST
PRISONERS
Section
77-29-1.

77-29-2.
77-29-3.
77-29-4.
77-29-5.

Prisoner's demand for disposition
of pending charge — Duties of
custodial officer — Continuance
may be granted — Dismissal of
charge for failure to bring to
trial.
Duty of custodial officer to inform
prisoner of untried indictments
or informations.
Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons.
Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Interstate agreement on detainers
— Enactment into law — Text of
agreement.

Section
77-29-6.
77-29-7.
77-29-8.
77-29-9.
77-29-10.
77-29-11.

Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
state agencies and political subdivisions to cooperate.
Interstate agreement — Application of habitual criminal law.
Interstate agreement — Escape of
prisoner while in temporary
custody.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
warden.
Interstate agreement — Attorney
general as administrator and
information agent.

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
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77-29-1

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. — Right to speedy trial,
Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ecution's actions or inactions, but was due to a
codefendant, who was to be jointly tried with
defendant and who was expected to plead guilty
at trial as the result of plea negotiations,
changing his plea to not guilty on the scheduled
trial date. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403 (Utah
1982).

ANALYSIS

Burden of compliance.
Commencement of period.
Delay caused by codefendant's action.
Delay caused by prisoner.
Dismissal with prejudice.
Forfeiture.
Good cause for delay.
Premature request.
Prosecutor's delay.
Showing of prejudice.
Standard of review.
Warden's delay.
Written demand.
Burden of compliance.
The language of Subsection (4) clearly places
the burden of complying with the statute on the
prosecutor. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421
(Utah 1991).
The trial court erred in concluding that defendant was in the same position as was the
state and therefore shared some of the responsibility to find out why his case had not been set
for trial. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah
1998).
The trial court erred in concluding that a
delay caused by the court clerk's error constituted "good cause" and thereby relieved the
prosecutor of its burden under this section.
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998).
Commencement of period.
Ninety-day period for prosecution under
former § 77-65-1 commenced on the day defendant notified county attorney of his request for
final disposition of case or cases pending
against him; and the filing of a complaint,
information or indictment did not affect the
commencement of the period. State v. Moore,
521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974).
Motion to dismiss charges against defendant
who was brought to trial 92 days after warden
received notice of his request for final disposition of pending charges was properly denied
since computation of then 90-day time period
commenced from date that notice was delivered
to county attorney and appropriate court. State
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975).
Delay caused by codefendant's action.
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of
the charges where the trial was delayed beyond
the 120-day time period, and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that there
was good cause for the delay, where the delay
was reasonable and not the result of the pros-

Delay caused by prisoner.
Where statute provided that prisoner be
brought to trial within ninety days of his request for disposition of pending charges, the
ninety-day disposition period was to be extended! by the amount of time during which
defendant himself created delay. State v.
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982).
When a defendant causes a trial to be delayed, he temporarily waives the right to a
speedy trial. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1986); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651
(Utah 1991); State v. Sioudonne Phathammavong, 860 P2d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Becaiuse defendant's own actions m requesting continuances, changing counsel, and agreeing to postpone trial until after disposition of
pretrial motions were the main cause of delay
and because defendant failed to show any
prejudice caused by the delay, he was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
Dismissal with prejudice.
Defendant's convictions were reversed and
the charges against him dismissed with prejudice, where the trial date was set for 218 days
beyond the time defendant filed the notice of
disposition, and the trial court's finding of good
cause could not be supported by a conclusion
that the delay was for the purpose of allowing
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve
their conflicts. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421
(Utah L991).
Forfeiture.
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have
charges against him dismissed by remaining
silent and failing to request an earlier setting
when trial court set date for trial beyond
ninety-day period required under former § 7765-1; burden of complying with statute rested
on prosecutor. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361,
453 P.2d 158 (1969).
Good cause for delay.
Where defendant's trial date was originally
set for time within ninety-day period provided
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
:

V.

:

LARRY DEAN COLEMAN,

t

Defendant/Appellee.

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
REQUEST TO STAY BRIEFING

Case No. 20000626-SC
Priority No. 15

:

COMES NOW Defendant/Appellee Larry Dean Coleman, by and
through counsel, Heather Johnson, and respectfully submits this
motion to dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacks original
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j) (1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996) .
Appellee further requests that this Court stay the briefing
schedule pending resolution of this motion. Appellant, the State
of Utah, filed its opening brief in this Court on 29 December
2000; Appellee's brief is currently due on 27 February 2001.
JlH.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
2001.

day of February,

s
HEATHER JO&JSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

HEATHER JOHNSON
JAMES A. VALDEZ
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-5444
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
REQUEST TO STAY BRIEFING

v.
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN,

Case No. 20000626-SC
Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant/Appellee Larry Dean Coleman ["Mr. Coleman"], by
and through counsel, Heather Johnson, hereby submits this
memorandum in support of Appellee's motion to dismiss and request
to stay briefing. Mr. Coleman respectfully requests this Court to
dismiss the above-entitled action on the grounds that this Court
lacks original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
Mr. Coleman further requests that this Court stay the briefing
schedule pending resolution of this motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Coleman was arrested on 28 September 1999 and later

charged by Information with the operation of a clandestine
laboratory, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37d-4(l) (a) and/or (b) (1998);x possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 48-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (1998) ; and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(1998). R. 3-4. After these
charges were filed, Mr. Coleman, who was incarcerated at the Utah
State Prison, R. 46, executed a "Notice and Request for
Disposition of Pending Charge[s]." R. 42. This Request was dated
28 October 1999, and was stamped "received" by the Wasatch
Records Division at the Utah State Prison in November. R. 42.
Mary Brockbrader, an authorized agent in the Record Unit at the
Utah State Prison, certified her receipt of the Request on 6
December 1999. R. 42.
A preliminary hearing was held 20 January 2000 and continued
until 24 February 2000. R. 21-35. Thereafter, Mr. Coleman was

1

Notice was given in the Information that Mr. Coleman was
subject to the enhanced penalty of a first degree felony pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5(1) (d), (f) , and/or (g) because "the
intended laboratory operation was to, or did, take place within
500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school;
and/or the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced an
amount of a specified controlled substance . . ., and/or the
intended laboratory operation was for the production of
Methamphetamine base." R. 3.
2

bound over for arraignment. R. 35. In March, Mr. Coleman
indicated his intent to file a motion to suppress evidence and a
motion to dismiss the charges due to the State's failure to
prosecute within 120 days after receiving the Request for
Disposition. R. 282 [5-7] . Hearings on these motions were held in
May. R. 288, 289. The trial court dismissed2 the charges in the
Information on 23 May 2000 due to the State's failure to bring
Mr. Coleman to trial within 120 days after receiving a Request
for Disposition. R. 95.3 The State filed a notice of appeal to
this Court on 20 June 2000. R. 97.

2

A copy of the trial court's "Order of Dismissal," R. 95, is
attached as Addendum A.
3

The dismissal was pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-291(1) (1999) ("Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional
institution of this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in the state any untried indictment or information, and
the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a
written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending
charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.")
3

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ORIGINAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 782a-3(2) (e) (1996), SECTION 78-2-2(3) (j), WHICH PROVIDES THIS
COURT WITH JURISDICTION WHERE THE COURT OF APPEALS "DOES NOT
HAVE ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION/' DOES NOT APPLY
The Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction in
this case because this is a criminal case appealed from the trial
court's final judgment of dismissal due to the State's failure to
bring Mr. Coleman to trial within 120 days after receiving a
Request for Disposition, R. 95. Section 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code
indicates that n[t]he Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction
. . . over: (e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital
felony . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .4 This statute
confers original appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals
in this case because:
(1)

The third judicial district court, from which this appeal

originates, is a court of record. State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860,
863 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
(2)

This is a criminal case. R. 3-6.

(3)

This case does not involve a conviction of a first degree or

capital felony. Mr. Coleman did not plead guilty to the charges,

4

The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(1996) is attached
as Addendum B.

4

R. 36-37, and he was not ever brought to trial and found guilty
because the trial court dismissed the case based on the State's
failure to bring Mr. Coleman to trial within 120 days after
receiving a Request for Disposition. R. 95.s
Thus, the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
Additionally, neither the docketing statement6 nor the
opening brief filed by the State provide jurisdictional authority
for this Court to hear this appeal. In its docketing statement,
filed 11 July 2000, the State cites to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a1(2) (a) (1999)7 and § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1996) in support of its

5

Additionally, this case arguably does not even involve a
first degree or capital felony. The Information charged Mr.
Coleman with two second degree felonies and a class B
misdemeanor. R. 3-6.
Notice was given in the Information that Mr. Coleman was
subject to the enhanced penalty of a first degree felony pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (1) (d) , (f) , and/or (g) . R. 3.
However, because this case did not proceed further, that
enhancement was not invoked.
6

The appropriate subsection granting jurisdiction to the
Utah Supreme Court must be cited in the docketing statement to
alert the Court that it has original appellate jurisdiction over
the case. Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P. 2d 33, 34
(Utah 1987) .
7

The State actually cites to the 1998 supplement of section
77-18a-l(2) (a). However, because the 1999 edition is identical to
the 1998 supplement, Mr. Coleman cites to the more recent 1999
edition.
5

assertion that this Court has jurisdiction in this case- However,
section 77-18a-l(2)(a) simply grants the prosecution authority to
appeal from final judgments of dismissal.8 Section 78-2-2(3) (i)
states that this Court has jurisdiction over "appeals from the
district court involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1996) . Because
this case does not involve a conviction for a first degree or
capital felony, R. 36-37, 95, section 78-2-2(3)(i) does not
provide this Court with jurisdiction.
In its opening brief, the State cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j) (1996) in stating that this Court has jurisdiction to hear
this appeal. Aplt. Br. 3. That section indicates that n[t]he
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction . . . over: (j) orders,
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction .
. ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) .9 However, because the
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction in this
case, section 78-2-2(3) (j) does not provide jurisdiction for this

Section 77-18a-l(2)(a) states that the prosecution may
appeal from ua final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal
of a felony information following a refusal to bind the defendant
over for trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (a) (1999) .
9

The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1996) is attached
as Addendum C.

6

Court.
In light of the above, briefing in this case should be
stayed and this case should be dismissed from this Court-10
/IrtL

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February,

2001.

>K-C
HEATHER JOIENSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

10

This motion should not be denied on the basis that this
case has already been opened and the State has already filed its
initial brief. "Whether by [discovery of the court] or by motion
of a party, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction will be considered
at any stage of the proceedings when it appears that jurisdiction
is, in fact, lacking." Silva v. Department of Employment
Security, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Further, Mt]he
parties cannot by their silent acquiescence invest jurisdiction
upon this court when the requisite elements are absent." Id.

7

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, HEATHER JOHNSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be
hand-delivered the original and four copies of Appellee's "Motion
to Dismiss and Request to Stay Briefing" and Appellee's
"Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Request to Stay
Briefing" to the Utah Supreme Court, 450 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and one copy to the Utah Attorney
Generalfs Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South,
Third Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854,
this

Ix-tiL day of February, 2001.

^E&e^
THER J0HNSON
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney
General's Office as indicated above this
2001.

8

day of January,
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FILED
UTAH SUPREME COURT

MAR 2 1 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT
ooOoo

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 20000626

v.
Larry Dean Coleman,
Defendant and Appellee.

ORDER
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied, and this case is
transferred to the court of appeals under Utah R. App. P. 44.

FOR THE COURT:

^H&r&isJJ,
£ P&I
/rWt*G+s*H,
^ wt
Date

(Cyt^'frfc *.
Rrchard C. Howe,
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on March 21, 2001, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
deposited in the United States mail to the parties listed below:
KRIS C. LEONARD
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
BRENDA J. BEATON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160E300S6THFLR
PO BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ROOM 236
JAMES A. VALDEZ
HEATHER JOHNSON
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424E500SSTE300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the trial court listed below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this March 21, 2001.

Deputy Clerk

»

Case No 20000626
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , 991920662

ADDENDUM E

12 0 DAY DISPOSITION
CALCULATION COMPARISONS
T r i a l Court

State

Mr. Coleman

10/19/99:
Information

10/28/99:
Notice Executed
18

days

11/16/99:
Prison "Received"
14

days

11/30/99:
Prelim. Cont.

12/21/99:
Roll call
3 0 days
1/20/00:
1st part of Prelim.
12

days

23

days

25

days

2/1/00:
Possible Sched. Date

2/24/00:
2nd part of Prelim.

3/20/00:
Arraignment
7 days
3/27/00:
Motion to Dismiss
3/3 0/0 0
5/15/00:
Hearing on Motion
9 days
5/23/00:
Case Dismissed

TOTAL DAYS PASSED:

123

138

